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Monetary Policy in West Germany
Rising inflation in the 1970s led central banks in
a number of industrialized countries to adopt
money growth targets as guides to policy. The
West German Bundesbank was the first central
bank to announce a target for money growth.
Apparently, the Bundesbank's policy also has
been among the most successful in terms of
reducing inflation. This Letter examines the
West German experience during the period
between 1975 and 1987, when the Bundesbank
targeted an unusual aggregate called Central
Bank Money (CBM). (The Bundesbank has
announced that it will target M3 in 1988.)
Although the Bundesbank chose this aggregate
because of its stable relationship with real out-
put and interest rates, the Bundesbank's success
in reducing inflation has not been due to rigid
adherence to its monetary growth targets.
Choosing a monetary target
Initially, the Bundesbank examined a number of
alternative aggregates as possible targets. The
narrow Ml aggregate (comprising currency and
demand deposits) was rejected as too unreliable
primarily because the decontrol of interest rates
in 1965-67 led to an increase in the extent of
substitution between demand deposits and
short-term deposits.
After some experimentation with other aggre-
gates, the broader M2 aggregate was introduced.
But the omission of savings deposits in M2
proved to be a problem. As a result of the sharp
interest rate swings of the early 1970s, it became
apparent that substitution between savings and
time deposits had a substantial impact on the
behavior of M2.
In response to the inadequacies of M2, the mon-
etary authorities defined a new aggregate called
M3. M3 internalized the deposit shifts that
plagued the M1 and M2 aggregates, but the
Bundesbank chose not to target this aggregate
on the grounds that assigning equal weights to
its demand, time, and savings deposit compo-
nents exaggerates the "moneyness" ofthe latter
two components.
To resolve this dilemma, the Bundesbank
devised the CBM aggregate, which placed more
appropriate weights on nontransaction balances.
The currency component was given a weightof
1. The weights were 0.166 for demand deposits,
0.124 for savings deposits, and 0.081 for time
deposits. These weights correspond to the
reserve requirements that were in effect for each
type of deposit in January 1974. CBM is like the
monetary base in that it comprises required
reserves; however, unlike the base, it excludes
excess reserves and nonresident holdings of
deposit accounts. This aggregate was expected
to share some of the characteristics of M3 and at
the same time reflect movements in transactions
aggregates to a greater extent than did M3.
The chart plots the growth rates of CBM and M3
for the period 1975-1986. The close relation-
ships between the growth rates of the two aggre-
gates suggest that the two have similar
characteristics. Moreover, statistical analysis
suggests that unlike Ml and M2, both CBM and
M3 have a stable relationship with real output,
prices, and interest rates. Apparently, the nar-
rower aggregates are subject to random portfolio
disturbances which make their relationships
with output less reliable. In contrast, both CBM
and M3 appear to internalize these disturbances.
Since any given monetary aggregate will not be
useful as a target of monetary policy unless it
has a stable relationship with the key mac-
roeconomic variables of interest, these findings
support the Bundesbank's decision to reject the
narrower aggregates as policy tools in favor of
CBM in 1975. Moreover, these results imply that
controlling CBM growth ensures price level
stability.
Targets for CBM
Since 1975, then, the Bundesbank has formu-
lated target growth rates for CBM consistent with
anticipated growth rates of real output and infla-
tion. The rate of inflation that the Bank has
allowed in these targets has declined over time.
For example, the Bundesbank incorporated a 4
to 5 percent inflation rate in its 1976 target, aFRBSF
3.5 to 4 percent rate in the 1981 target, and a 2
percent rate in the 1986 target.
The Bank announced single point targets for
CBM growth through 1978 and in 1979 began
to announce its targets as ranges. The upper
bound ofthe target range decreased steadily
from a high of 9 percent in 1979 to 5 percent in
1985, blltin·1986 and 1987 the upper bound
was increased by a half-percentage point each
year. The width of the range also was narrowed
from three to two percentage points beginning in
1984, but was increased to three percentage
points in 1987.
The track record
The Bundesbank's record in hitting its target
ranges has been mixed. CBM growth was above
target from 1975 to 1978 - the four years in
which the target was a single point. In two of
these years, though, the discrepancy was rela-
tively small- around one percentage point.
Over the nine years in which a target range has
been announced (that is, 1979-87), CBM growth
fell outside the target range four times. In 1980
and 1981 CBM growth ended the year below its
lower bound. In 1986 and 1987, by contrast,
CBM growth overshot the target by relatively
wide margins.
A closer examinationof the Bundesbank's track
record since 1975 reveals that in addition to its
concern for price level stability, the Bundesbank
attaches great importance to exchange rate sta-
bility - especially the stability of the deutsche-
mark-dollar rate. The exchange rate matters
because Germany's foreign trade is a significant
proportion of its GNP, and the mark-dollar rate
is especially important because, after the dollar,
the mark is one of the most important reserve
currencies in the world. Any sign of instability in
the dollar sets up speculative movements in the
mark.
To see how the Bundesbank's concern for
exchange rate stabilization influenced monetary
policy, it is useful to divide the period under
review into three sub-periods. The first covers
the five years immediately following the adop-
tion of the CBM target. The mark tended to
appreciate relative tOlhe dollar over this period
and the Bundesbank generally allowed CBM to
exceed its target. In the next period, 1980-1985,
the mark fell relative to the dollar. CBM ended
the year below the lower bound of its target
range twice during this period and was below
the midpoint once. It never ended the year
above the upper bound of its target range. The
years 1986 and 1987 constitute the final sub-
period. In this period, the mark appreciated rela-
tive to the dollar and CBM grew above the target
range in both years.
Statistical tests confirm the Bundesbank's dual
emphasis on exchange rate and price level sta-
bilization. These tests find that an increase in
inflation leads to a reduction in CBM growth rel-
ative to the mid-point of its target range in the
current and the subsequent quarter. Similarly, an
appreciation in the value of the mark leads to an
increase in CBM growth above the midpoint of
its target range. However, this response is less
pronounced than is the response to inflation. In
contrast, the directresponse to real GNP growth
is ambiguous.
Thus, the Bundesbank appears to follow a policy
that actively offsets the impact of exogenous
exchange rate changes on the domestic econ-
omy. This requires easing in the face of sus-
tained currency appreciC;ltion and tightening
when the currency depreciates. The impact of
osuch a policy on inflation depends upon the
willingness of the central bank to respond to
decreases as well as increases in the foreign
exchange value of its currency.
The evidence suggests that the Bundesbank
indeed has been able to do this. The Bank
allowed the monetary targets to be overshot
when the mark appreciated during the late
1970s and again in 1986-87, but it also tight-
ened when the mark depreciated during the first
half of the 1980s.
The relatively low rates of inflation that have
prevailed in Germany over this period reflect the
success of this strategy. For example, the GNP
deflator increased by only 3 percent in 1986,
following increases of approximately 2 percent
in each ofthe previous two years. Although the
Bundesbank allowed the rate of inflation to go
up following the 1979 oil price increase, the
highest annual increase in the GNP deflator
recorded over this period was a 4.8 percent rate
of inflation in 1981.• Growth is measured over the previous four quarters.
Annual Growth Rates of CBM and M3*
These relatively low rates of inflation imply that
the Bundesbank's concern for exchange rate sta-
bilization has been carefully balanced against its
concern for price level stability. Consequently,
the Bank's anti-inflation stance remains credible,
even though it has exercised considerable dis-
cretion in the implementation of monetary
targeting.
The West German experience also demonstrates
that while it is advantageous to have a long-term
anchor for the price level, strict adherence to
monetary targets is not a precondition for keep-
ing inflation under control. Thus, discretion with
respect to monetary targets has not led to high
inflation primarily because the Bundesbank has
reacted in systematic ways to economic distur-
bances. That is, the Bundesbank has been will-
ing to tighten as well as loosen monetary policy
in response to exchange rate developments. The
Bundesbank successfully has followed a slightly
more complex rule than strict adherence to
monetary targets by permitting deviations from
target mainly in response to movements in a sin-
gle variable: the exchange rate.
been largely at odds with the behavior of output
and inflation in the u.s. As a consequence, the
Fed today is faced with a dilemma similar to that
faced by the Bundesbank earlier. The Fed's M1
has been rendered ineffective as a policy tool by
increased substitutability between deposit
accounts included in M1 and those not included
in M1. And although the Fed's broader M2 and
M3 aggregates do not appear to have been as
susceptible to the random portfolio disturbances
that have afflicted M1 in recent years, it is
unlikely that they will be as closely related to
movements in output and inflation as M1 once
was. Thus, it may be useful to consider mone-
tary aggregates similar to CBM that attempt to
weight the moneyness of financial assets. Some
research along these lines already has been car-











Lessons from the German experience
The Bundesbank's rejection of the narrow aggre-
gates in favor of targeting CBM, which has a
more stable relationship with key mac-
roeconomic variables, has potentially important
implications for the u.s. Until recently, U.s.
monetary policy has placed primary emphasis
on the Federal Reserve's narrow transactions
aggregate, M 1. However, the behavior ofthe
Fed's M1 aggregate over the past few years has
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The table entitled, "Selected Assets and Liabilities of Large Commercial Banks in the Twelfth
Federal Reserve District," will no longer be published in conjunction with the Weekly Letter.
For those in need of these data, a more timely publication entitled, "Weekly Consolidated
Condition Report of Large Commercial Banks and Domestic Subsidiaries" (F.R. 2416x), is
available from the Statistical and Data Services Department ofthis Bank.